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Preventing Rwanda in a Rawlsian World 
 
Gerbrand Hoogvliet 
 
 
 An intuitive and commonly held view of human 
rights is that they are good and worth upholding because 
they are good for persons. A violation of human rights 
causes suffering to persons and since suffering is 
intrinsically bad we should take a stand against such 
violations. By making explicit the assumption that all 
persons are equal we get what is usually referred to as a 
Cosmopolitan View of human rights. This view suggests 
that we are required to intervene in violations of human 
rights on the basis of the two assumptions stated above. The 
degree of intervention and the severity of the violation 
necessary to warrant such an action are up for debate but all 
arguments of this sort ultimately rely on a view that takes 
persons as primary. Other reasons for intervention are often 
of a more ad hoc variety, such as Nagel’s humanitarian 
duties1, and will not be discussed in this paper. 
 In light of the strong appeal of the Cosmopolitan 
View and the fact that it seems to be widely held (although 
admittedly in a large variety of forms) it is striking that 
Rawls chooses a radically different approach to the role of 
human rights in international relations and rejects 
Cosmopolitanism. In his Law of Peoples (LOP) he takes 
Peoples rather than persons as primary and therefore ends up 
with an interpretation of human rights that is no longer 
grounded in persons. This version of human rights is more  
                                                
1 see Thomas Nagel, 'The Problem of Global Justice', Philosophy 
and Public Affairs 33(2005): 113-47 
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instrumental in nature and serves as a guideline for the 
conduct of international relations among Peoples in the 
Society of Peoples.  
 Following Rawls’s lead in LOP, this paper shall start 
by considering Rawls’s notion of human rights as part of an 
ideal theory. I shall show that in order for it to be ‘political 
in the right way’ it cannot be grounded in persons. I will 
then go on to consider whether in the context of a non-ideal 
theory Rawlsian human rights are a sufficient motivation for 
intervention. I shall take the Rwandan genocide in 1994 as 
the paradigm case of a preventable violation of human 
rights2 and test whether the Law of Peoples could persuade 
decent and liberal societies to act in such cases. I shall then 
go on to argue that the primacy of Peoples in Rawls fails to 
lend sufficient weight to human rights and furthermore does 
not respond adequately to the nature of human rights 
violations in a globalized world. 
 Rawls’s ideal theory starts from the perspective of 
Peoples, which are different from nation states in that they 
have a moral character and have by definition reasonably 
just or at least decent regimes (p. 27)3. Not all states and 
societies are Peoples and in fact only liberal democracies 
and decent societies count as such. The word decent is used 
here, as in Rawls, to indicate a society that accepts the Law 
of Peoples. A detailed analysis of the concept of People lies 
beyond the scope of this paper but it is important to note that  
                                                
2 For an account of the Rwandan genocide and its preventability 
by the international community, see Lt. General Romeo Dallaire, 
Shake Hands with the Devil (New York: Carol&Graff Publishers, 
2004) 
3 Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers refer to John 
Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1999). 
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these are the primary agents in the Law of Peoples. He 
arrives at this primacy by following Kant’s reasoning in 
Perpetual Peace that a world government is both 
undesirable and unfeasible (p. 36). Instead of an oppressive 
or ineffective world government, Rawls suggests a 
decentralization of power by relying on the cooperation of 
Peoples. Thus Peoples - and societies in general - become 
the primary agents in the Law of Peoples.  
 However, Rawls’s choice for the primacy of Peoples 
over persons as agents with regard to human rights is also a 
necessary one. In order for both liberal and non-liberal 
decent Peoples to affirm human rights they must be 
“political in the right way,” that is, independent of any 
comprehensive doctrine (p. 81). For liberal Peoples this is 
important since they respect the fact of reasonable pluralism 
- the fact that different people in society hold different sets 
of beliefs - and  they do therefore not endorse politically any 
comprehensive doctrine. Decent, non-liberal Peoples do 
often have a comprehensive doctrine and it is hence 
important for them that human rights do not run counter to 
their comprehensive doctrine. Thus human rights must be 
political in the right way so that decent Peoples can 
reasonably affirm them. 
 For Rawls, the Cosmopolitan View, which takes 
persons as primary, fails this criterion of being political in 
the right way. As stated in the introduction to this paper, the 
Cosmopolitan View takes persons as primary and would 
thus ground human rights in their effects on persons. For 
example, freedom from torture is a human right because 
torture is bad for a person. However, as stated above, this 
requires that one buys into the utilitarian notion that 
suffering is bad and pleasure, defined as the opposite of 
suffering, is good. The same view can also be supported on  
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the basis of the Kant’s second categorical imperative, which 
requires the treatment of humans not merely as means, a 
condition clearly violated in the practice of torture. The 
problem is that in both cases we would have to hold (part of) 
a certain comprehensive doctrine in order to be able to 
affirm human rights. This is objectionable to Rawls since it 
would exclude a decent Peoples who hold a comprehensive 
doctrine that is opposed to utilitarianism or Kantianism. 
Human rights cannot be grounded in persons since this 
requires acceptance of a part of a comprehensive doctrine 
and would make them political in the wrong way. 
 Unable then to ground human rights in persons, 
Rawls chooses to include them in the Law of Peoples which 
is a set of principles agreed upon by Peoples in the second 
Original Position (OP). The second OP resembles the well 
known first OP that takes place between persons of the same 
society behind the veil of ignorance. The second OP situates 
Peoples symmetrically and fairly, as rational actors behind a 
veil of ignorance which prevents them from knowing 
specifics about their own situation (eg. population, land size, 
natural resources etc.) (p.30). In this position the Peoples 
then choose the Law of Peoples from among a list of 
different formulations of the same principles.  In the Law of 
Peoples, human rights are based upon the Peoples’ 
consideration of their political conception of justice (p. 40) 
rather than a conception of the good which is what motivates 
choices in the first original position. To make sure that both 
liberal and decent Peoples can agree to the same set of 
human rights this set is rather limited compared to, for 
example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In 
turn these human rights so determined are also used as a 
necessary condition for decency. More importantly for our 
present purposes, however, human rights are formulated so  
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that a violation of them could justify political, economic and 
ultimately military intervention in a society by liberal and 
decent Peoples (p. 80). 
 The main importance of human rights for Rawls then 
does not lie in their value for persons but in their 
instrumental value for determining when intervention in an 
outlaw state is justified. Their sole motivation comes from 
the agreement of Peoples in the second Original Position. To 
be more precise, human rights arise from the agreement of 
liberal Peoples in that second OP, with the decent Peoples 
later affirming the same beliefs. It is in fact the affirming of 
these beliefs that makes makes them part of the Society of 
Peoples, which is the community of liberal and decent 
Peoples. However, the question remains as to why Peoples 
in the second OP care at all about violations of human rights 
in outlaw states? Since outlaw states do not accept the Law 
of Peoples they are not Peoples. Considering that we take 
Peoples as primary, concern about what goes on in outlaw 
states can only be secondary. Furthermore, the Law of 
Peoples states as its fourth principle that “Peoples are to 
observe a duty of non-intervention”(p. 37). The reasons for 
intervention of any kind and especially the military variety 
are thus slim in Rawls’s ideal theory.  
 We can however construct an ideal theory view on 
military intervention from the other Laws. The Law of 
Peoples states that Peoples have the right to self-defense and 
a duty to help burdened societies. Presumably, outlaw states 
are burdened societies, but it is doubtful  whether political or 
economic assistance will alleviate human rights violations 
within an acceptable time frame.  
 Within ideal theory we are then left with only one 
legitimate ground for the type of military intervention that 
can prevent severe human rights violations, namely the right  
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to self-defense. Countries then have a right under ideal 
theory to intervene in human rights violations if their own 
security is at stake. This can plausibly be extended to the 
stability of the Society of Peoples as well. The mandate that 
ideal theory provides for intervention then is that countries 
are allowed to intervene militarily if their own security or 
the stability of the Society of Peoples is at stake. Put 
differently: human rights violations that have international 
spill-overs allow for military intervention, but atrocities 
neatly and purposefully contained within the borders of an 
outlaw state do not. If this is indeed the conclusion from 
ideal theory I hold it to be both undesirable and morally 
deplorable. It would furthermore fail to prevent the 
paradigm case of genocide, Rwanda, which was almost 
entirely contained within the country.  
 Rawls’s non-ideal theory however, provides a 
somewhat more satisfactory view on nationally contained 
violations of human rights. For the most part it is a 
reformulation and concretization of the ideal theory from 
Part II of LOP.  
 In the section on Just War Doctrine Rawls reasserts 
that well-ordered societies can only wage war against “non-
well-ordered states whose expansionist aims threaten the 
security and free institutions of well-ordered regimes and 
bring about war”(p. 94). Wars are thus to be fought only on 
the basis of self-defense and are never to be started. This 
clearly fails to prevent any form of genocide occurring 
within the borders of a state and thus fails the paradigm case 
of Rwanda.  
 As stated before, human rights provide a criterion by 
which intervention can be justified. Rawls elaborates most 
on this idea in a footnote to the section on Just War 
Doctrine. Because this passage is essential in constructing  
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Rawls’s position vis-a-vis human rights I will quote it at 
length: 
“Earlier I said that we must at some point ask 
the question whether it is ever legitimate to 
interfere with outlaw states simply because 
they violate human rights, even though they 
are not dangerous and aggressive towards 
other states[...] Certainly there is a prima 
facie case for intervention of some kind in 
such cases, yet one must proceed differently 
with advanced civilizations than with 
primitive societies. Primitive, isolated 
societies [...] we really have no way to 
influence. [Advanced societies] must be made 
to realize that without human rights, their 
participation in a system of social cooperation 
is simply impossible.[...] Is there ever a time 
when forceful intervention might be called 
for? If the offenses are egregious and the 
society does not respond to sanctions, such 
intervention in the defense of human rights 
would be acceptable and would be called for” 
(p. 93-94) 
Rawls thus does, although hesitantly, endorse military 
intervention. The idea is that Peoples will first exert 
diplomatic, political and economic pressure on an outlaw 
state to get them to bring these violations to an end. Only if 
all of these methods fail is a military intervention called for.  
 Although many theories of international relations call 
for intervention in defense of human rights, only very few 
have been able to motivate nations to actually do so. I will 
thus turn my focus to the implications of Rawl’s non-ideal  
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theory and its ability to motivate Peoples to intervene 
militarily in outlaw states. 
 As stated before, Rawls’s notion of human rights in 
the context of international relations is limited. One of the 
reasons for this is that human rights play an instrumental 
role in LOP. They define a necessary condition for decency 
and a criterion, as mentioned above, for intervention. It can 
thus be argued that they are fundamentally instrumental and 
their importance is almost entirely contingent on the role 
they play within the theory. In fact if it were otherwise they 
would be political in the wrong way.  
 If this criticism stands it has serious implications for 
LOP. It is important to emphasize the degree of motivation 
and determination it takes for a People to put its soldiers in 
harm’s way for the benefit of persons with whom they have 
no particular relationship. After all, they are coming to the 
aid of citizens of an outlaw state, and since outlaw states 
aren’t Peoples it is unclear to what extent their citizens 
would affirm the Law of Peoples. There is thus no promise 
of reciprocity which in Rawls’s A Theory of Justice serves as 
one of the key motivating factors in helping others. 
 Considering the high degree of required motivation it 
is doubtful whether a merely instrumental version of human 
rights will be capable of persuading Peoples to intervene 
when these rights are being violated. 
 This criticism of Rawls, however, does not 
accurately reflect the nature of human rights in LOP. 
Although it is true that the role of human rights is almost 
entirely an instrumental one, its origins are normative. This 
can be seen in the section on human rights where Rawls 
claims that “the violation of this class of rights is equally 
condemned by both reasonable liberal peoples and decent 
hierarchical peoples”(p. 79). This suggests that the concept  
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of human rights does have moral content and thus carries 
more motivational weight.  
 However, if we analyze further the origins of this 
importance of human rights we encounter a problem. The 
most logical way of thinking about the way in which human 
rights originate from the moral ideas of liberal and decent 
Peoples, is that they are based on a wide-spread sentiment 
within society that the violation of human rights is bad for 
persons. As I have shown above, however, this requires the 
acceptance of part of a comprehensive doctrine, which is 
fine for individual persons but prevents it from becoming 
part of the outcome of an original position. Unable then still, 
to ground the importance of human rights in their effect on 
persons, we are forced to conclude that human rights are 
important in and of themselves. Indeed, this is what Rawls 
seems to suggest as well in the quote above when he states 
that “intervention in the defense of human rights would be 
acceptable and would be called for (emphasis mine)” (p. 94). 
We intervene in defense of human rights, not in defense of 
the persons suffering their violations.  
 Contrasting this view of the importance of human 
rights with the importance of persons as expressed by the 
Cosmopolitan View I think the latter has a stronger appeal 
and ability to motivate. In fact I strongly doubt whether the 
Rawlsian view can provide sufficient motivation for 
intervention at all. In light of this I think one ought to prefer 
the Cosmopolitan View which, though certainly not shared 
by everyone, provides sufficient motivation to a sufficient 
number of nations to intervene and bring an end to atrocities 
in outlaw states. A theory of international relations that 
seems unable to prevent genocides such as the one in 
Rwanda can hardly be an improvement of the current 
situation. 
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 A possible response for Rawls to this critique is that 
like the basic structure in A Theory of Justice, people, or in 
this case Peoples, will over time grow affectionate towards 
the global basic structure and its rules and will come to see 
them as valuable. Hence they would over time be willing to 
put the lives of their citizens at risk in military operations 
aimed at defending human rights. The effectiveness of this 
response is dubitable since it remains unclear to what extent 
Rawls really establishes a basic structure for global 
interaction. In fact, the views expressed in LOP are largely 
based on the non-existence of such a basic structure on the 
international level. It is thus unclear if there is a sufficient 
basic structure in the Society of Peoples towards which 
persons could feel affection. It is consequently doubtful that 
such an affection can arise at all, leaving us again with a 
theory that lacks motivational weight. 
 I think there is nevertheless a broader problem with 
the ability of the Law of Peoples to effectively regulate 
international politics in order to bring about a better world. 
This problem is expressed by Allen Buchanan in his paper 
Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished Westphalian 
World4 in which he argues that LOP fails to take into 
account the complexities and intricacies of the modern 
world. Although Buchanan’s criticism applies to the whole 
of LOP, I shall here focus on its implications for Rawls’s 
view of human rights and humanitarian intervention. I shall 
argue that Buchanan’s criticism points in the same direction 
as the objections raised earlier in this paper, namely that the 
weakness of Law of Peoples lies in the fact it that takes 
nations or Peoples as primary. 
                                                
4 Allen Buchanan, ‘Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rules for a Vanished 
Westphalian World’, Ethics 110(July 2000): 697–721 
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 As Buchanan points out, dividing up the world in 
Peoples and defining all international interaction in terms of 
Peoples fails to capture the reality of the modern globalized 
world. In the world we live in today, cross-border 
interactions on a non-governmental level are pervasive and 
no ideal theory can legitimately choose to ignore this. The 
importance of non-governmental actors in global politics 
poses challenges to governments to which any theory of 
international relations should strive to formulate answers. 
Specifically, the governments of outlaw states - or 
governments of any state for that matter - no longer have a 
monopoly on the violation of human rights. In fact, the 
responsibility lies increasingly with militia groups that 
operate within countries or across borders. To be sure, 
Rawls is correct in choosing governments as those who 
should follow the Law of Peoples in acting on the global 
stage, but he is wrong in identifying other governments as 
the only parties affected by such actions. The field of 
international relations deals with what governments ought to 
do, but should not limit itself to interactions between 
governments as this would exclude many dimensions of 
modern politics. However, the theory expressed in LOP is 
even harder to apply when we take into account all these 
intricacies. For example, a militia perpetrating crimes 
against humanity within the border of a single country 
would not be a proper target for applying political and 
diplomatic pressure since these militias do not operate on the 
government level. It is difficult to determine if Rawls thinks 
we could intervene at all in such a situation where violations 
are not sanctioned by the government. But if we are capable 
of responding, then within the framework of the Law of 
Peoples we are left with only two options: to do nothing or 
to intervene militarily. Any of the other measures suggested  
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by Rawls requires a government with which to interact. This 
seems problematic to me and although many of these 
objections can be probably be answered through ad hoc 
extrapolations of the Law of Peoples, the problem remains 
that taking Peoples as primary does not correspond to reality 
and as a consequence fails to accurately address many of the 
current political issues such as human rights violations. 
 A Cosmopolitan View on the other hand that takes 
persons as primary, also recognizes any form of organization 
between these persons, not just the nation state. It thus 
provides a blueprint for international relations which 
responds to the dynamic nature of associations among 
persons and does not run into the problem of defining the 
proper agents to whom actions should be directed. 
Furthermore, since it takes persons as primary, human rights 
get a more solid grounding in their value as being beneficial 
to persons. The Cosmopolitan View thus yields a theory in 
which governments can address their actions to any 
organization of persons, both nationally and across borders, 
and intervene in violations of human rights on the basis of 
alleviating the suffering of persons. Certainly, this view 
needs to be elaborated further to determine its ultimate 
viability as a rule for conducting international politics. 
However taking persons as the starting point of a theory 
allows us to respond better to the problems of a globalized 
world and gives us a more satisfactory and intuitive 
understanding of the nature of human rights. I think Rawls’s 
concern for the neutrality of any principles of international 
politics is an important one and the necessity of accepting 
part of a comprehensive doctrine in order to be able to 
endorse the Cosmopolitan View is a troubling notion. In fact 
it may prove to be the case that the group of nations willing 
to support the Cosmopolitan View is much smaller than the  
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Society of Peoples envisioned by Rawls. However, given the 
choice between a theory of foreign relations that is 
acceptable to all Peoples but fails to make a strong stand 
against human rights violations and furthermore does not 
resemble today’s political reality, or a more normative view 
that does provide the necessary motivation to intervene on 
behalf of the victims of slavery, torture and genocide, I 
choose the latter. This may leave us with a view acceptable 
to fewer nations, but a more meaningful guideline for those 
who do accept it.  
 Rawls’s Law of Peoples does call on liberal and 
decent Peoples to intervene in human rights violations such 
as the Rwandan genocide. However, since its notion of 
human rights is not grounded in persons it fails to supply the 
necessary persuasive strength to motivate Peoples to bring 
about such an intervention. Furthermore, the fact that Law of 
Peoples takes persons as primary means it cannot respond 
adequately to the intricacies and challenges of a globalized 
world. Because both these problems originate from a focus 
on Peoples rather than persons I argue that today’s 
governments are better served with a political theory that 
takes persons as primary. The Cosmopolitan View currently 
seems to be the best candidate for such a theory but in 
pursuit of a person-affecting theory of international politics 
better candidates may yet be revealed. 
 
 
